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Victor Polterovich
1
Employment-wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
2
Abstract
The paper is intended to explain low sensitivity of employment decisions observed
in transition economies where insider ownership prevails and capital markets are
not highly developed. We introduce a stability concept for employment levels of a
labor-managed firm and prove that there exists a segment of stable employment
levels. If a level belongs to the interior of the segment then the firm keeps the same
labor input level under any not too large changes. By contrast, the wage rate is re-
sponsive. Only the firms on the boundaries of the segment may reconsider em-
ployment decisions. Deterioration of market conditions entails decreasing labor
inputs for firms with much excess labor and, the same time, increases employment
for firms with low levels of labor input. This creates inter-firm flows of workforce
and restrains the rise of total unemployment. Stability segments exist also for firms
where employment-wage decisions are made by bargaining between workers and
managers, and may exist for manager-dominated firms as well. Several concepts of
labor hoarding are discussed.
	 Labor-owned enterprises, transition, Russia
                                                                       
1 Central Economics and Mathematics Institute and New Economic School,
Nakhimovsky prospekt 47, 117418 Moscow
2 This is a revised version of a paper prepared in framework of the NES research
program for the conference “Transforming Government in Economies in Transi-
tion”, Moscow, September 18-19, 1997. The research was completed during my
visit to the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition. Its hospitality
and assistance are gratefully acknowledged. I would like to thank Simon Com-
mander, Fabrizio Coricelli, John Earle, Randall Filer, and Jukka Pirttilä for discus-
sions and valuable comments, and Christine Lang for her numerous style improving
suggestions. All mistakes are my own.Victor Polterovich
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1 Introduction
Labor markets in transition economies have exhibited a number of unex-
pected phenomena, which immediately attracted the attention of many re-
searchers (see, in particular, Commander and Coricelli (1995), Polterovich
(1993), Layard and Richter (1995), Dolgopyatova (1995), Commander,
Fan, and Schaffer (1996)). For a number of countries, statistical data and
surveys show that firms’ employment decisions display low responsiveness
or even insensitivity to changes in price and demand. In this respect Rus-
sian firms demonstrate the most surprising behavior (Blanchard, Com-
mander, and Coricelli (1995)). During 1992-1996 Russia’s GDP fell about
38% whereas unemployment amounted to 9.3% and officially registered
unemployment was 3.4% of total labor force in 1996 (Social-Economic
Situation... (1996, p. 179). Employment in industry decreased by 26%, a
larger drop than for the whole economy, and industrial production was
roughly halved (see Table 1). Even if we take into account involuntary lay-
offs
3, the figures for output decline and employment decline turn out to be
incomparable.
4 Surveys confirm that comparatively high employment co-
exists with huge excesses of production capacities in Russia (Results of a
survey of Russian enterprises economic activity (1996).)
Striking evidence of labor hoarding is revealed by a survey described in
Moskovskaya (1998): 45% of respondents (managers) pointed out that in
1996 their enterprises would have been able to produce the same outputs
using a smaller number of workers. The average wage was 13% lower for
enterprises with excess labor.
Of course some of these firms fire workers, but surprisingly many of
them also hire workers. This fact is stressed in Commander, McHale, and
Yemtsov (1995).
                                                                       
3 This would increase the unemployment rate by 1.5 percentage points (Rossiysky
statisticheskiy ezhegodnik (1996), p.104.)
4 Developments in 1997 and 1998 do not change the conclusion. For these two
years GDP drop amounted to 4%. In 1998 the unemployment rate was 11. 8 % ac-
cording to the ILO definition, and thr officially registered unemployment rate was
2.7% (Rossiyskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik (1998), p.16; Sotsial’no-
ekonomicheskoye polozheniye (1998), pp.7, 279).Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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Researchers are not as unanimous with respect to wages. Layard and
Richter (1995) assert that wage rates are much more flexible in Russia than
in developed countries. Commander, Dhar, and Yemtsov (1995), using
World Bank Survey data, found that wages respond weakly to firm-specific
financial characteristics. Indeed, after the shock of January 1992, when real
wages dropped drastically, the average wage rate for Russian industry did
not change, or even increased slightly over a period of a year and a half.
However, the wage fell in 1994, and the decrease in 1995 was much larger
than the decline in output. The decrease in average wage rate amounted to
48% for the Russian economy and to about 50 % for industry during 1992-
1996, which was the same as the fall in output.
5 These observations lead to
the conclusion that wage rates revealed much greater flexibility than em-
ployment rates.
The high degree of solidarity between workers and managers is another
important fact. During the transition period, conflicts between these two
groups were rare. Of 2.2 million enterprises and organizations, only 8300
were involved in strikes in Russia in 1996, and among them, 7400 were
educational organizations. There were about 450 strikes in coal industry
and only 82 in all other industrial sectors. Most of the strikes were directed
not against managers but against federal government. Not only worker in-
voluntary discharges but also manager layoffs were rare. A very significant
number of managers were able to retain their positions from the Soviet pe-
riod, which certainly does not promote fast restructuring.
In attempting to explain these observations, many researchers stress the
fact that most Russian firms are insider-owned. The processes involved in
the transition of property rights to insiders have been analyzed in a number
of works (Polterovich (1993), Frydman, Rapadzinsky (1993), Rutgaizer
(1993), Boyko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995)). Strong evidences and de-
tailed empirical analysis of insider influence are contained in Earle, Estrin,
and Leshchenko (1996), Earle and Estrin (1997), Linz and Krueger (1998),
Jones (1998), and Djankov(1999) 
6 Therefore we take this fact as given and
                                                                       
5 This figures do not take into account wage arrears and benefits in kind, which
play an important role in Russia.
6 “In companies that had participated in some form of privatization, we find that, on
average, insiders had 66.1 percent of all shares, divided between workers….with
46.2 percent and managers with 19.6 percent: the remaining 15 percent of shares
were still held by the state.” (Earle and Estrin (1997), p.24). In the sample consid-Victor Polterovich
Institute for Economies in Transition 10
try to develop a theoretical model to explain the stylized facts described
above.
7










                                                                                                                                                                    
ered in Djankov (1999), Russian insiders owned 51.4 percent of shares in 1995,
and 59.6 percent in 1997. 	
7 Firms’ employment decisions were low responsive also in NIS and Czech Repub-
lic ( Djankov (1999), Basu, Estrin, and Svejnar (1997)).
1992/91 1993/92 1994/93 1995/94 1996/95 1996/91
GDP 85.5 91.3 87.3 95.9 96.5 62
Real wage in the economy
per employee 67 100.4 92 74 105 48
Employment in the economy 98 98 98 97 98 89
Investment 60 88 76 90 82 30
Industrial production 82 86 79 97 95 51
Real wages in industry per
employee 71 92 89 80 108 50
Employment in industry 95 98 89.5 92.5 93 74
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Unemployment rate
4.7 5.5 7.4 8.8 9.9 11.2
Officially registered
unemployment 0.8 1.1 2.2 3.2 3.4 2.7Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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Domar (1966) was the first to mention that the labor-managed firm theory
developed by Ward (1957) is not realistic because it does not take into ac-
count the tradeoff between the positive utility of an increasing wage rate
and the negative effect of a decrease in the number of workers employed.
The hypothesis of this tradeoff was supported by empirical investigations
(Craig and Pencavel (1993), Prasnikar, Sveinar, Mihaljek, and Prasnikar
(1994)). Now a conventional assumption is that the worker’s utility func-
tion depends on earnings and on employment. It is clear that if the substi-
tution elasticity of employment level for wages is small, then low respon-
siveness of employment should be observed. It is temptating to derive low
responsiveness from special properties of a utility function or to refer to
the influence of managers and political authorities. We argue, instead, that
the nature of low responsiveness is more fundamental and suggest a sim-
pler explanation.
Insider ownership can be efficient if capital (partnership) markets are
properly developed (Dreze (1976, 1989), Sertel (1987)). However, this is
hardly expected for the early stages of transition. This is clearly not the
case in Russia. Insider ownership simply prevents outsider control. Work-
ers probably do not recognize themselves as owners who can employ addi-
tional labor or sell their part of future returns. There is no real institutional
difference between workers who own some shares and those who not, since
dividends are insignificant and mechanisms for control of the firm by
stockholders do not work. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to
consider workers as a team lobbying for an increase in short-run utility.
However, their utility is similar to that usually assumed for trade unions,
and we know from McDonald and Solow (1981) that bargaining between a
trade union and managers entails stickiness of wages, not employment.
An attempt to explain labor hoarding using a modification of the con-
ventional model of the labor-managed firm was made in Commander,
McHale, and Yemtsov (1995). Their results rest crucially on two assump-
tions: the firm is a monopolist and its production function is of the Leontief
type. In this case, the firm’s value-added reaches an absolute maximum as
a function of labor input, L. The firm may choose a level of labor L higher
than its maximizing level so that some employees arel not used at all. This
is labor hoarding. In this set-up the wage rate is a constant and does not
depend on either technological coefficients or output prices. Thus the
model predicts high wage stability, which is not supported by the data.Victor Polterovich
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Below we use a framework very similar to that of McDonald and Solow
(1981) to explain the stylized facts described above. However, McDonald
and Solow consider the trade union to be a player whereas we take the
firm’s employees to be the main bargaining participants. Employment de-
cisions do not change the number of trade union members but do change
the number of decisionmakers in the insider-owned firm. This seemingly
minor modification in the set-up leads to the concept of stable employment
levels and, as we will see, entails quite different conclusions.
In fact, stability of special employment decisions (optimal by Ward’s
definition) and their insensitivity to output price increase were proved in
Steinherr and Thisse (1979) and Bonin (1981)). These authors got similar
partial results also for worker-owned firms using compensation schemes to
dismiss workers (see also Miyazaki and Neary (1985)).
Below, we define the concept of a stable employment level for a labor-
managed firm and prove that the set of all such levels forms a segment. If a
firm’s labor input belongs to the interior of the segment, then the input is
kept constant, independently of variations in market and technological
conditions (if the variations are not too large). For every shock, only firms
with employment levels in certain neighborhoods of the edges of the seg-
ment will reconsider employment decisions. The wage rate turns out to be
flexible. It is also shown that deterioration of market conditions entails de-
creasing labor inputs for firms with large excesses of labor and, the same
time, increasing employment for the firms with low labor inputs. This cre-
ates inter-firm flows of workers and restrains the rise of total unemploy-
ment.
We argue that the use of sophisticated compensation schemes is hardly
possible in the underdeveloped and uncertain institutional settings of tran-
sition economies, such as Russia, and that use of a simple outside earning
approach does not bring about sensitivity of employment decisions.
In the next Section, the stability concept is introduced and the existence
of a stability segment is proved for labor–owned firms. Comparative statics
results are contained in Section 3. Section 4 presents a modification of the
model, in which insiders are allowed to earn additional wages outside of
their firm. Different concepts of labor hoarding are discussed in Section 5.
We show in this Section that a firm may keep workers, that cannot be used
at all. Section 6 discusses the roots of manager-worker solidarity and dem-
onstrates that insensitivity of employment decisions may take place in
manager-dominated firms as well. The main results are then generalized inEmployment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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the context of a bargaining model in which the players are managers and
workers (Section 7). Section 8 concludes.
2 Stable employment levels in the labor-managed firm
Let us assume that the labor input of a firm consists of identical individu-
als, each taking part in the decisionmaking process and maximizing the
expected value of a utility function




	≥ 	δ 	≥ 	 . (4)
Here 1- δ  is the probability of being dismissed (assumed equal for all
workers}, / is the wage rate,  the wage utility, 2 the reservation wage,
and 7 the initial labor input.
3		 - c represents the firm’s value-added as a function of labor, 4. For
convenience, we assume 3(0) = 0 and denote fixed costs by . If δ  < 1 for
a solution (δ ,  N ) of (1)-(4) then obviously  N = δ  L. This means that
the probability of prolongation of a job contract, δ  , must be equal to the
ratio of the new and current levels of labor input. We also assume that the
total value added is equally distributed among workers and that the capital
stock is fixed. Material resources are chosen optimally in order to derive
the value added function.
This part of the setting is almost identical to the well-known model of
McDonald and Solow (1981). However the following stability concept,
which is a central point of our paper, does not seem to be used in the lit-
erature.Victor Polterovich
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 An employment level 7 is stable if the pair (δ  = 1, 7) is a so-
lution for the problem (1)-(4).
In other words, the current employment level is stable if the workers do
not want to change it.
In this and in the next sections, we assume that
(i) 3(4) is a nondecreasing, concave, smooth function,
3(0) = 0,3	′ (4)→  0 as 4 →  ∞  , 3	″  (4) < 0;
(ii) (/) is an increasing , concave, and smooth function, 	0	8
(iii) there exists 4 > 0 such that 9(4) > 2.
Let 7* be the employment level that maximizes the employment -wage
function, 9(4) = (3(4) - )/4. Obviously, 7* is stable. But our model gen-
erates a multiplicity of stable solutions.
There exists 7
A￿6	7:
 such that the set, ;, of all stable em-
ployment levels is the segment [7:	7
A].
Proof. It is simple to show that (1)-(4) is a concave programming prob-
lem. Necessary and sufficient conditions for 7 to be stable are:
                             Ψ 7	0	97	1	′ 979	′ 77	"	2	≥ 	 (5)
7	≥ 	7: (6)
where “prime” denotes first derivative.
One can check that
79′ 	0	3′ 	"	9 (7)Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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79′′ 	0	3	′′ 	"	!9	′  (8)
Therefore
Ψ′ 	0	′′ 9	′ 	
￿7	1	′ 3	′′ 	<		 (9)
This means that Ψ  is decreasing. Due to our conditions Ψ (7*) > 0 and
Ψ (7) < 0 if 9(7) = 2, 7> 7* since 9′ (7) <0 in this case. Hence ; is a seg-
ment [7*, 7
∧ ] where 7
∧  is the unique root of the equation Ψ (7) = 0 and 7
∧  >
7* . The proof is complete.
8
It follows from this proof that 9 (7
∧  ) >	2. Fig 1 illustrates Proposition
1.
The setting considered above can be also described as follows. A firm
wishes to increase 4((9(4))- (2)) provided 4 does not exceed the initial
employment level 7. If the maximum is reached for 4=7 then the firm tries
to increase (9(4)). If 7≥  7
*, this is impossible, and 7 remains unchanged.
If an employment level 7 of a firm is not stable, i.e. if it does not belong
to ; then the firm looks for a solution (δ
1, 7
1) of the problem (1)-(4) to
change its employment level. It might happen that the new level, 7
1 ,
 is un-
stable as well. If so, the decision process should be continued. Surprisingly
it is not the case.
 If 7 < 7*, then 7* is a solution of (1)-(4). If 7 > 7
∧   , 
 then 7
∧
is a solution of (1)-(4).
The first part of the proposition is obvious. The second statement fol-
lows immediately from the fact that the first order conditions for (1)-(4)
under 7 > 7
∧  can be reduced to the equation Ψ (4) = 0.
Proposition 2 says that a firm can reach its stable segment in one step.
Therefore it is reasonable to believe that most of the firms have stable em-
ployment levels even if prices and technologies change quickly. Our next
task is to describe the firm’s reaction to the environment changes.
                                                                       
8 Another way to prove Proposition 1 is based on the observation that the left hand
side of inequality (5) is the derivative of a concave function, Lu(W(L)).Victor Polterovich
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3 Explaining insensitivity of employment decisions
Let us consider the volume of raw materials, ., used in the production pro-
cess. One may assume that the value-added function, 3"	, is derived from
the following maximization problem.
3(7,	, =) = *.	[ ≥ 0 (((., 7) - =.), (10)
where ( is a concave increasing production function, 	and = are positive
prices of the output  = ((., 7) and the material resources .. Then 3 is con-
cave and increasing with respect to 7.
Below we assume that the wage utility function u is strictly concave so
that ′′  <0.
Let ( be a homogeneous function. Then the left endpoint,
7*, of the stability segment is a decreasing function of  and an increasing
function of = and .
. Assume ( has a positive mixed partial derivative,	([/ > 0.
Then the right endpoint, 7
∧  ,of the stability segment is an increasing func-
tion of the output price  and a decreasing function of the input price, =, of
the reservation wage, 2, and of the fixed costs, .
The Cobb-Douglas function fulfills conditions of both Propositions 3
and 4.
The result in Proposition 3 is well known (see, for example (Domar
(1966)). It is simple to check that if the function 3		depends on a parameter
, 3 = 3(7,	), then the derivative of 7* with respect to  is
																																								L:z￿	0	Vz￿	"	LVLz￿	5LVLL￿
Let ν  be the degree of homogeneity of the function (, 0 < ν  ≤  1. First order
conditions and Euler’s formula for homogeneous functions entail the rela-
tions
3S =	(,  73/S  = ν ( + (1- ν )(([ )
2 /([[ ,    3T  = - .,
73/T  = - . - (1 - ν )([ /([[ ,Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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and we conclude that 7*S  < 0,  7*T  > 0.
To prove Proposition 4, one can use the equality
9
Ψ ]  = ″ 9] (3/  - 9) + ′ 3/] ,
where 9] 	=	3] /7,  9S  > 0,  9T  < 0;  3/￿S￿ = (/  -	([￿(/￿[ /([[  > 0,
3/￿T￿ = (/￿[ /([[  < 0, since (/￿[  > 0. Also 3/￿ < 9 , since 7
∧   falls to the right
of 7* (see fig.1). Therefore Ψ  is increasing with respect to  and decreas-
ing with respect to =.
Proofs of the statements concerning the reservation wage, 2, and the
fixed cost, , are similar and we omit them.
The picture of the firm’s behavior now seems clear. If the labor input of
a firm belongs to interior of its stability segment, then the firm’s employ-
ment level is not sensitive to changes, provided they are not too large. By
contrast, wage levels are responsive. Only those firms located near the
edges of the segment can reconsider employment decisions. It is notewor-
thy that a deterioration of market and technological conditions entails an
increase in employment for firms with low levels of labor hoarding and a
decrease in employment for the firms with large amounts of excess labor.
An improvement in the conditions enlarges the segment but does not
change the labor inputs, since former edges turn out to be interior points of
a new stability set. The last phenomenon may cause the so-called ratchet
effect.
Thus the labor equilibrium distribution is path-dependent in our model.
Two technologically identical firms may have different stable levels of
employment and different wage rates. Certainly, such a system is ineffi-
cient. It is characterized by large interfirm wage differentials.
It is worthwhile to compare the picture given above with data for Yugo-
slav labor-managed firms. In Prasnikar, Svejnar, Mihaljek, and Prasnikar
(1994) a 147 firm sample for the 1975-1979 period and an 18 firm (non-
random) subsample were studied. The output price – employment effect
                                                                       




)) belongs to so-called contract curve. The
statement of Proposition 4 may be derived from the contract curve properties stud-
ied in McDonald and Solow (1981).Victor Polterovich
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was found to be statistically insignificant for the large sample but negative
and statistically significant for the subsample, indicating perverse behavior
for some firms and weak total response. A longer time period was consid-
ered for the subsample, and the conclusion was confirmed. The existence
of firms with qualitatively different responses to changes in output prices is
an argument for the use of our model, though it remains to be proved that
differences in employment levels are responsible for the difference in re-
sponses. Large interfirm wage differentials were also observed for Yugo-
slav firms and were the subject of a long debate (see Estrin and Svejnar
(1993) for a discussion).
Different employment responses must entail interfirm labor flows. In
fact, the flows arise if some firms like to hire workers, suggesting com-
paratively high wage rates; in our model this happens at the left edge of a
stability segment under a deterioration of market conditions. This explains
an empirical observation made in Commander, McHale and Yemtsov
(1995). Interfirm flows restrain a possible rise of total unemployment rate
within the system.
The worker’s utility function, $(1	9(7))	=		(9(7)), is decreasing on
the stability segment, ;. Therefore one can argue that firms located in the
stable segment must reduce their labor hoarding due to voluntary layoffs,
so that all of them will gradually approach the optimal employment level,
7*. While this is plausible, the process depends on the opportunities of
finding better jobs and it can turn out to be quite slow. The equilibria de-
fined are transitional, but they still do not explain transitional phenomena.
4 Insiders with outside earnings (free-range insiders system)
The equality Ψ (7
A) = (9(7
A)) + ′ (9(7
A))(3	′ (7
A) - 9 (7
A)) - (2) = 0 (see
(5) and (7) above) implies that the marginal added value, 3	′ (7
A	), of the
maximal stable employment level,	7
^ ,
 is inferior to the reservation wage, 2,
if the utility function, , is strictly concave. Therefore firms can increase
the average wage if some of their employees earn the reservation wage for
the firm. This idea can be realized through different institutional settings. If
the capital (partnership) market is developed, some workers will find it
profitable to sell their shares to the firm and to leave it voluntary to work
for the reservation wage. Under a proper price, this would be profitable
also for all those who stay with the firm (Dreze (1976), Sertel (1987)). An-Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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other institutional option is the use of a compensation scheme to encourage
voluntary dismissals (Steinherr and Thisse. (1979), Bonin (1981)). The
third possible option permits workers-founders to hire additional workers
for a competitive wage. All three options assume clear property rights
which establish a difference between insiders-owners and non-owners, as
well as strong law enforcement of mutual obligations. This is not the case
in Russia. Most privatized Russian enterprises are joint stock companies.
However, their shares are generally not traded on stock exchanges, divi-
dends are usually not paid, and standard mechanisms of firm control by
stockholders do not work. There are no institutional differences between
workers who hold company shares and those who not. It appears that
workers collectives do not recognize themselves as owners who can sell
their property or hire additional labor. Managers face too much uncertainty
to take on the long-run obligations entailed in compensation schemes.
However, there is a strategy that allows for increasing average wages
without demanding any complicated institutional setting, and some Russian
firms do use it.
They give long leaves to some of their employees formally or permit
them in fact to work outside the firm for a period of the time. Then the
worker’s total wages comprise the sum of a wage paid by the firm and a
reservation wage. In this case the reservation wage, 2, cannot be inter-
preted as an unemployment benefit but rather as wages for a part time job,
including shadow activity, or as an implicit wage for home and private plot
work.
To take this policy into account
10, let us consider a modified value-
added function 
(4) - , where

4	0	*.￿0￿≥ ￿￿	34">	1	2	>
The firm maximizes the sum of its value added and outside earnings with
respect to a number > of free-range workers. Let 7
o be the solution of the
equation 3	′ (7) = 2. Since 3	′ (7
^) < 2 = 3	′ (7
o) < 3	′ (7*), one has
                                                                       
10 In a more realistic set-up, variability in work hours must also be taken into ac-
count (compare Miazaki and Neary (1985)). We assume that working hours are
fixed.Victor Polterovich















o is the optimal quantity of labor that should actually be used
really inside the firm if 4 is large enough.
In Section 2 we used conditions (i) to find a right end-point of the sta-
bility segment. Now we cannot do this since 
 does not approach zero
when 4 →  ∞ . Let @ (4) = (
(4)- )/ 4 be the modified wage function and
Φ  the corresponding modification of the function Ψ ,
Φ (7) = (@(7)) + ′ (@(7))( 
′ (7) - @ (7)) - (2).
If 76	7
R then 
′ (7) = 2 and Φ (7) ≥  0, due to concavity of  (see fig. 2).
Therefore the stability set in this case is the infinite segment [ 7*, ∞  ), and
all labor exceeding 7
o is «employed» outside the firm.

A stable employment level is effectively stable if it is used
totally within the firm.
The considerations above show that for the free-range insiders system
the following statement holds.
 . The set of all stable employment levels is the segment
; = [	7*, ∞  ). The set of all effectively stable employment levels is the
segment ;
o = [ 7:	7
R ], where 3	′ (7
o) = 2 and 7
o fulfills (11).
It is noteworthy that ; and ;
o are both determined by the value-added
function and do not depend on the utility function, .
Let us assume now that the function 3 is derived from the maximization
problem (10). Then the following analogue of proposition 4 is valid.
 Let ( have a positive mixed partial derivative, ([/ > 0.
Then the right end-point, 7
o , of the effective stability segment is an in-Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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creasing function of output price , and a decreasing function of input price
= and reservation wage 2.
This proposition can be established directly by differentiating the iden-
tity 3′ (7
o(ζ ),  ) = 2 with respect to parameters 	0		= and 2, taking into
account that 3/￿S  > 0,  3/￿T < 0.
Thus in the free-range insiders system, the stability segments are larger
and effective stability segments smaller than the stability segments in the
system in which outside earning is not allowed. But the main features of
employment decisions are similar for both kinds of systems. The difference
is that free-range insiders’ firms with right end-point employment levels do
not fire workers when market conditions deteriorate. Instead they encour-
age them to seek outside earnings. However, these workers are happy to
accept job offers from firms that pay higher wages. Therefore there are
interfirm labor flows in this system as well.
In what follows, we assume again that outside earnings schemes are not
institutionally available, bearing in mind that all results can be reformu-
lated little efforts to apply to a free-range system.
5 Labor hoarding
Insensitivity of employment decisions to market conditions means there is
labor hoarding. To ensure that this is totally clear, one should define the
concept of labor hoarding or excess employment. However there is no con-
ventional measure of labor hoarding, and different authors defined it dif-
ferently (Bonin (1992), Commander, Dhar, and Yemtsov (1995)).
Indeed, any definition of excess labor depends on the concept of «nor-
mal» or «optimal» employment level 7norm : if 7norm is given and 7 is the
current employment level,  then 7- 7norm  measures labor hoarding.
One might be inclined to the notion that a labor level is redundant if a
worker earns a wage higher than his marginal productivity. This leads to
the conclusion that the appropriate normal employment level would be 7
*=
*.	9(7), i.e. 7Z  such that 3	′  (7Z) = /, where / is the actual wage
paid by the firm. Then every level 767
* would be considered as an excess
level. However this approach, though acceptable for the long-run, is hardly
appropriate for the short-run. The unique efficient labor distribution among
identical firms assigns an equal quantity to each firm. It is natural to con-
sider the difference between a current level and the average as a true meas-Victor Polterovich
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ure of firm labor hoarding. If a firm employs more then 7
* but less then the
average, one should say that it experiences a lack of labor.
Thus the correct approach would be based on a comparison of an actual
and an efficient labor distribution. However, the calculation of such a dis-
tribution is so difficult in practice that there is a little hope of solving it.
One needs less pretentious and more constructive methods to estimate
short-run labor hoarding.
If a part of the system is competitive, then one can compare current em-
ployment and the profit maximizing employment, 7F , under the actual
competitive wage rate and take the difference 7"	7F as a measure of labor
hoarding. This measure is also doubtful with respect to imperfect transi-
tional markets.
The minimal estimation of labor hoarding corresponds to the ‘normal’
employment, taken as the minimal labor quantity needed to support the
current production level. This assumes that the value-added function does
not increase if the employment level exceeds a critical value, 70 A survey
mentioned in the Introduction (Moskovskaya (1998)), showed that almost
half of Russian enterprises had a larger numbers of employees than their
respective critical values.
11 It is an extreme case of labor hoarding when
some workers employed workers do not work at all. Could our model ex-
plain this seemingly irrational behavior?




instead of 3(4). The function A does notfulfill all of the conditions (i). It is
smooth everywhere except one point, 70 , and has zero first derivative for 4
6	70. Instead of the function Ψ (7) (see (5)), we have now
Ψ 47	0	947	1	′ 94794′ 77	"	2
                                                                       
11 The main reasons for this were lack of demand and lack of credit (see
Results…(1996)).Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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Assume ′′  < 0, 70  > 7
* , and Ψ 4( 70+ξ ) > 0 for a positive ξ . Then there
exists a stability segment [7
￿	74] which contains 70 as an interior point
(fig. 3). The right edge 74 is the root of the equation Ψ 4(7) = 0. Since
94′ (7)7 = 3′ (7) - 94(7) = - (30- )/ 74￿, the corresponding wage rate,
/4 = (30- )/ 74 , is the solution to the equation (/) - ′ (/))/ - (2) = 0
and does not depend on market conditions. Therefore the maximal stable
employment level,
74￿0	3￿"	5	/4	
depends on market conditions only through 30. If 7￿	<	7	≤ 	74 then 7"	7￿
is a lower estimate of labor hoarding.
How does the level of labor hoarding respond to a deterioration in mar-
ket conditions? One might expect tighter external constraints, ie a reduc-
tion in 70.. If 7 stays inside the stability segment, the firm does not change
its employment level and the estimate of labor hoarding increases. The
right edge of the segment shifts to the left and the left one shifts to the
right, as above, which slows unemployment growth.
Thus labor hoarding arises if a worker-owned firm is forced to cut its
supply due to external constraints, and workers’ decisions take into ac-
count the risk of layoffs.
6 Insider-owned open joint-stock company:
the puzzle of oversolidarity
In Russia (and some other transition economies) the same governance
mechanism was imposed for all types of privatized enterprises (outsider-
owned, worker-owned, etc.). Most of them were transformed into ‘open’
joint-stock companies regardless of their ownership structures. A number
of ‘closed’ joint-stock companies were created at the preliminary sponta-Victor Polterovich
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neous stage of privatization, but a special presidential order was issued in
1993 that prescribed to transform them into open companies. There was a
strong hope that immediately after privatization workers would begin to
sell their shares so that all enterprises would be taken over by outsiders.
However things did not turn out this way; surveys did not reveal any sub-
stantial shifts of ownership to outsiders.
Another surprising phenomenon is the absence of serious conflicts be-
tween managers and workers. Managers do not dismiss workers and work-
ers do not discharge managers. The number of people involved in strikes
was insignificant (357,000 in 1992, 120,000 in 1993, 664,000 in 1996)
(Russian Statistics Annual (1996), Social-Economic Situation in Russia
(1996)). Most of the strikes were conducted by school teachers and were
actually directed against government, not against managers. Out of 8,278
strikes taking place in 1996, 7,396 were in education (Social-economic
situation in Russia (1996), p. 182).
A number of different explanations for these surprising features could
be discussed (see Layard and Richter (1993) for a list of causes). I would
emphasize both the local governments’ resistance to mass layoffs and pe-
culiar mentality of Russian managers, which is the result of a long history
and a certain kind of public pressure, which have been effective up to now:
mass worker layoffs are considered to be destructive
12.
However, there is a hypothesis, that seems important but which is not
discussed in the literature
13. I try to formulate it below.
The combination of insider ownership and governance structure of open
joint stock companies is the worst type of industrial organization. It creates
a network of relations between outsiders, managers, and workers that ham-
pers restructuring. Both managers and workers groups want to avoid at-
tracting outsiders for fear of layoffs. This in turn restricts the possibilities
                                                                       
12A model developed in Shleifer and Vishny (1996) is based on the assumption that
politicians subsidize managers to keep excess employment. The influence of the
cultural inheritance is studied in Linz (1998).
13 It was written in 1997. I did not know that substantially the same obser-
vations as described below were made by Aghion, and Blanchard in their
presentation to an EBRD conference in 1996. They use the observations to
explain insiders collusion in resale of shares to outsiders (Aghion and
Blanchard (1998)).Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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to attract new restructuring capital. However this is not the only conse-
quence of the disparity between the organizational structure and ownership
structure. This disparity has a strong impact on bargaining between manag-
ers and workers and creates specific threat strategies for both parties. If
workers hold a significant proportion of shares, then mass worker layoffs
are impossible for managers who want to keep their positions within the
firm. Layoffs would lead to mass selling of workers’ shareholdings to out-
siders, who might prefer to change managers. In many firms, the managers
had a substantial number of the available shares. Workers then have good
reasons not to want to discharge managers, even if they hold a majority of
shares. In fact the discharged managers might sell their shares to outsiders,
which increases the chances for mass worker layoffs. Since both worker
and manager groups are unsure of the intentions of their own members as
well, they have no absolute power, even if they hold a majority of the
shares and are forced to search for a compromise. In spite of natural con-
tradictions between managers and workers, the situation should entail a
high degree of insider solidarity. This is precisely what has been observed
in Russia.
Note that such «strategic trap» situations do not arise in closed joint
stock company structures. In this case, a dismissed insider has no right to
sell his shares to outsiders. My hypothesis is that the structure of the closed
joint stock company is more efficient than that of open ones owned by in-
siders.
For the latter case, insensitivity of labor inputs may arise even if the
firm is manager-dominated.
Consider an extreme situation in which outsiders hold almost half of all
the firm’s outstanding shares so that just one additional share is enough to
control the firm. Let 1-=	be the probability that a dismissed worker will sell
a share. Assume a fixed (competitive) wage rate, / , and let 7P* be the em-
ployment level that maximizes the firm’s profit function ,(4) = 3(4) -  -
/4. Then 3	′  7P*) = /.
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$(47) = * {=
/￿1; 1}[3(4) -  -/4] + (1 - *{=
/￿1; 1}), (12)
and  is the manager’s reservation salary. $(47) is the manager’s ex-
pected revenue.
If 7	<	7P*, then 7P* is the solution of the problem (12), and 7 is not
stable. The set of stable employment levels is a segment [7P:	7PB], where
7P^ is the solution of the following equation
Ψ P(7) = 3′ (7) - / - '	=[3(7) - /7	-		-	] = 0,
provided 3(7P*) - /	7P* >  + .
Similar to the situation of section 2, Ψ P(7) is a decreasing function. If
Ψ P(7) > 0 then $(47) increases with respect to 4 in a left neighborhood
of the point 4 = 7	Therefore $(47)	<	$(77) for all 4	<	7. Workers lay-
offs are unprofitable for managers in this case.
Let 3  = 3(7) be an increasing function of price . Then the edges of
the stability segment, 7P*() and 7P^() are functions 7P*(), 7P^() of 
as well. It is easy to check that
7P:5	0	"3/S53//
7PB5	0	3/S	"	3S	'	=	5	C3S	"	/'	=	"	3//D
If (9/ > 0 for a production function (	then 3/S > 0 and functions 7P*()
and 7P^() are increasing (compare proposition 4). If  decreases, then
only firms with the largest labor hoarding dismiss workers. The others do
not respond.
Thus manager employment decisions may be weakly responsive as well
if managers experience pressure from outsiders.
Our discussion shows that there are at least two mechanisms by which a
worker can be dismissed, if a decision is made to decrease the labor input.
The first, the direct mechanism, is the base for the models described in
previous sections. If one takes into account the second mechanism (based
on share reselling), then stability intervals and labor hoarding would in-
crease. This is one of the results that we derive in the next section.Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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7 Managers and workers bargaining
There is a general consent among researchers that employment-wage deci-
sions are results of compromises between managers and workers. Surveys
reveal that managers take the main strategic decisions and that workers’
influence in this respect is weak though not negligible (Dolgopyatova
(1995), Jones (1998)). On the contrary, both parties have strong influence
on employment and wages (Jones (1998), table 3).
Hence, the labor-managed and manager-dominated firms should be con-
sidered as special cases of the insider-owned enterprise, and our approach
should be developed to model possible compromises between workers and
managers.
Let  be the total salary of managers treated as a consolidated bargain-
ing participant. We keep the notation of section 2 to describe a group of
workers as the second participant. A state of the system is defined as a pair
(7	) consisting of an employment level, 7 and a size of managers’ salary,
, or as a pair (7/).
If 4 is an employment level and  is a level of managers’ salary, then
the workers’ wage rate is equal to 9(4	) = (3(4) -  - )/ 4. Let us denote
; = {(δ , 4	)  4 ≥  δ 7, 0 ≤  δ  ≤  1, 0 ≤   ≤  3(4) - }.
Let $(δ ,/) and >(δ , ) be worker and manager utility functions.

. A state (7	) and an employment level 7 are Pareto stable if
the triplet (1, 7	) is Pareto optimal with respect to the functions >(δ , )
and $(δ , 9(4, )) on the set ;. If (7	) is Pareto stable and / = 9(7) then
the pair (7/) is also Pareto stable.
We postulate that
$(δ ,/)= Λ (δ )(/) + (1- Λ (δ ))(2),
>(δ ,	) = Γ (δ )?() + (1- Γ  (δ ))?(),Victor Polterovich
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where ?() is manager utility of a salary ,  is the manager reservation sal-
ary, Λ (δ ) and Γ (δ ) are the probabilities that a worker or a manager
14, re-
spectively, will keep her job. Both probabilities depend on a proportion δ
of workers slated for dismissal.
We argue in section 6 that the worker’s probability of keeping his job is
defined by two mechanisms. Therefore it is reasonable to presume that
Λ (δ ) is the product of two probabilities.
We assume that Λ (δ ) = δϕ (δ ); the functions 'Γ (δ ), 'ϕ (δ ) are nonde-
creasing, smooth and concave, with 0 ≤  Γ (δ ), Λ (δ ) ≤  1; and that there exists
an 4 such that 9(4, ) > 2. Then first-order Pareto optimality conditions
are necessary and sufficient. They imply that (7, ) is stable iff the follow-
ing relations hold:
      λ E(/) ≥  / - 3′ (7)- γ  )()/7, (13)
where
E(/) = ((/) - (2)) / ′ (/),  )() = (?() - ?())/? ′ (),
λ 	0			Λ′ 	5	Λ 	γ 	0	Γ′ 	5	Γ 
/ = 9(7	), (14)
3′ (7) ≤  / , (15)
2	≤ 	/	≤ 	9(7). (16)
The contract curve, / = F(7), is defined as a solution to the equation
λ E(/) = / - 3	′ (7)- γ )((7	/))/7.               (17)
Differentiating (17), one obtains
                                                                       
14 The model captures also the case where managers do not fear to be firedEmployment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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F	′ (7) = (- 3	′′ 7
2 - γ 7)	′ ( 3	′ -/) +γ ))/ 7
2,       (18)
where
 = λ E	′  -1 - γ 	)	′ .
The numerator in (18) is positive whereas the sign of  in the denominator
is indefinite.
Taking into account Λ (δ ) = δϕ (δ ), where ϕ (δ ) is nondecreasing, one ob-
tains λ  ≥  1. It follows from the definition of E and ) that
E	′ 	0	"	E′′ 5′ 	)	′ 	0		"	)?	′′ 5?	′  (19)
Therefore E	′≥  1, )	′≥  1, E	′ (2) = 1, )	′ ()= 1. If γ  ≤   λ -1, then  is defi-
nitely positive for  = . Let us assume that
 > 0 for /	6	2. (20)
The assumption is valid if λ =1, γ  =0. It is also valid for every λ >1 if γ  is
small enough. The assumption means that the probability of being fired due
to workers’ dismissal in a small proportion is not changed more signifi-
cantly for managers than for the employed workers. In view of (18) and
(20), the contract curve is upward sloping.
The point (7
￿
E	2) , 2 = 3	′ (7
￿
E) is Pareto stable and lies above the con-
tract curve.
Consider 7E	 such that 9(7E￿, ) = 2. Since E(2) = )() = 0 and 9(7E	, )
> 3	′ (7E), the point (7E	, 2) is located below the contract curve. Therefore
the contract curve intersects the line /	= 2 at some point G, and the bound-
ary of the Pareto stable set includes a horizontal segment HG (Fig. 4). Since
F(7
￿
E) < 9(7E) and F(7E	) > 9(7E	), there is 7’ such that 7
￿	E￿<	7’	<	7E
and F(7’) = 9(7’, ).
The conditions (13) - (16) define a quadrilateral area IHGJ on the
plane (7	/) (Fig. 4).
                                                                                                                                                                    
but nevertheless would, for cultural reasons, not like to dismiss workers.Victor Polterovich
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We are studying a problem that seems to be similar to those considered
in trade union theory (Booth (1995)). However, there is a subtle distinction
between the union theory setting and ours that leads to important differ-
ences in conclusions. A trade union has a fixed number of members, 7, so
that every employment decision, 4	implies a definite probability of being
fired: (7 - 4)/7, where 4 is assumed to be strictly inferior to 7. In our set-
ting, 7 is the number of workers employed by a firm; it can be changed in
the process of decision making. A decision, 4, means zero probability of
being dismissed if 4	≥ 	7, and stability means that the employment level is
not changed in the decision process. The corresponding optimal problem is
parameterized by initial employment. That is why we have a two dimen-
sional ‘contract set’ rather than a one dimensional contract curve
15.
It is straightforward to check that the following relations hold for de-
rivatives of F with respect to parameters λ , γ , ,	2,		:
Fλ  = -E5 < 0 if /	62;   Fγ  = -	)/7 <0 if 6	; FD = - γ )D￿/7> 0 if γ  >0;
FE = - λ EE￿5 >0 if λ  > 0;  FS = (73/S +  γ  )V3S) / >0 if  3/S > 0.
Thus the following proposition is valid.
. Pareto stability sets expand if the parameters of unemploy-
ment disutility λ , γ  increase and contract if reservation wages, reservation
salaries, or output prices increase.
Using different bargaining approaches, one might obtain more restricted
sets of possible outcomes. As a rule, the set must be one dimensional, not
just a point as would usually be expected.
For example, let us consider a generalized Nash bargaining approach
(Svejnar (1986)).
Let / = 2 and  =  be threat points and consider a nonsymmetric Nash
bargaining problem:
                                                                       
15 In a general case, one can say that a point . is Pareto stable on a set K with re-
spect to functions
(L.		 =1,... if . is Pareto-optimal on K under		0	.. Pareto stable sets can have
rather complicated structures even for quasiconcave functions.Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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(?( ) - ?())
β [(/) - (2)] Γ
β (δ )Λ (δ ) →  *. (21)
/ = (3(4) -  -  ) / 4 ≥  0 (22)
4 ≥  δ 7 (23)
0 ≤  δ  ≤  1, (24)
where β  is an indicator of manager power in the bargaining, β >0.

An employment level 7 is Nash stable if (1, 7, 
) is a solution
of the problem (21)-(24) for some 
. The set of all (7	/), such that 7 is
Nash stable and / is the corresponding wage rate, is called the Nash sta-
bility curve.
Obviously every Nash stable level is Pareto stable.
Assume that the problem (21)-(24) has a unique solution under 7= 0.
Denote it by (δ 1 , 71 , 1 ). Then obviously δ 1 = 1, and 71 is Nash stable.
Denote
(4/) = 3(4) -  - /4. (25)
One can check that 4(9(4	 )) is concave with respect to (4) and
strictly concave with respect to 4. If 7	≤ 	71 , then the employment solution
of the problem (21)-(24) is equal to 71. If 7	≥ 	71 , then (23) is fulfilled as an
equality and (21) -(24) turns out to be equivalent to a concave program-
ming problem. Therefore an employment ,7 ,is Nash stable iff there exist /
and  = (7/) such that (14), (16) and the following relations are fullfiled :
)() = β 7E(/), (26)
(βγ  + λ )E(/) ≥  /	- 3	′ , (27)
where ), E are defined as above.Victor Polterovich
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The inequality (27) is a consequence of (13) and (26). Equations (26), (25)
define a Nash stability curve / = L(7). By the definition of (71 , 1), we
have
/1 = 9(71, 1) = L(71) = 3	′ (71).
Denote  = 7(β E	′  + )	′ ). Thus
L ′  =( )′ 	/ - β E	)/	< 0 (28)
on the Pareto stable set, since )	′  > 0, E   > 0, E	′ > 0 and / = 3	′ (7) - / < 0.
Thus L(7) is downward sloping.
Now let us chose 7 so large that 9(7	) < 2 and consider a solution
(δ 2 , 72 , 2) of the Nash problem (21)-(24). Obviously, δ 2 <1 (otherwise,
(21) would be negative) and condition (27) is fulfilled as an equality. All
the conditions (14), (16), (26) are also valid for (72 , 2). Thus 72 is Nash
stable and (72 , /2 = 9(72 , 2)) belongs to the contract curve. The Nash
stability curve looks like 41 42 in fig.4, and its projection, 7172 , is a Nash
stability segment.
Thus we have proven the following statement.
The set of all Nash stable employment levels is a segment
[71, 72] , and the corresponding wage rates are given by a downward slop-
ing curve, L(7), such that the points (71, L(71)), (72, L(72)) are the bar-
gaining results for very small and very large initial labor inputs.
If an initial employment level, 7, is not Nash stable, then the Nash bar-
gaining outcome may be 71 or 72. Similarly to the simplest case of section
2, the Nash stability segment is reachable in one step. If 7 belongs to the
interior of the segment, then the firm maintains this employment level in-
dependently of (not too large) external shocks.
Let  be a parameter and L(71(), ) = 3	′ (71(),). Then 71]  = (3/] –
L])/ , where L] is the derivative of L with respect to the second variable,
	0	L/"	3//. The function L"	3/ is increasing with respect to 7 in a neigh-
borhood of 71  (see fig.4) and thus  > 0. Considering z = , 2, β ,  ,where
 is an output price, one obtains
LD =  )D￿5 < 0, LE =-β  7	EE￿5 >0;  Lβ  = -7E	5 < 0; LS = )	′ 3S￿5 >0.Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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Therefore
71D =-	)D￿5	> 0,  71E = β  7	EE￿5 < 0.
71β  = 7E	5  > 0.
71S = (3/S- )	′ 3S￿5)/  = (3/S	7β E	′  + )	′ ( 3/S	7	"	3S))/. (29)
If the production function is homogeneous, then the second term in (29) is
negative (see the proof of proposition 4), and the sign of 71S￿ is indefinite
and depends on β .
Consider now what does happen with 72. One must study the equation
F(72, )  = L(72, ) to calculate 72]. However, it is simpler to use the equa-
tion M(72, )= L(72, ), where M is a solution of the equation
λ 1	βγ E/0	/	"	3	′  (30)
Denote =(λ + βγ )E ′  -1, and assume λ + βγ  > 1. We have
M/ = - 3//5	 > 0 ; Mβ  = -γ E5 ; Mγ  = -γ E5	 < 0; Mλ  = - β E5  < 0;
ME=-(λ + βγ )EE5 >0;
MS0	"3/S5	< 0.
Since 72]= (L]"M])/ (M/"	L/), M/"	L/ >0 , we obtain from (20) that
72γ  >0 ; 72λ   > 0.
(M/"	L/ )72β  = - 75 + γ E5 = - 7E5	 < 0 .
72D  < 0;  (M/"	L/ )72E  = -β 7EE5 + (λ +βγ )EE5 = (λ +βγ )7EE(β  + )	′ )/ < 0.
72S  > 0 .
The following statement is a straightforward consequence of the above cal-
culations.Victor Polterovich
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 The stability segment 71 72 expands when indicators of un-
employment disutilities, λ  and γ , increase and shrinks when the manager
power, β , or the reservation salary,		 increase. It also shrinks if β  is small
and the worker reservation wage 2 increases.
The difference in behavior of the 71 and 72 derivatives with respect to
reservation values,  and 2 , can be easily explained. Having a stronger
status quo position, managers are able to obtain a larger salary by increas-
ing employment at 71 or reducing it at 72. An improvement of a worker’s
status quo position entails lower unemployment disutility and a wish to
raise the wage rate via a decrease in employment at 71 or at 72. If β =0, then
 =0 and 71 does not depend on 2. The larger the value of β  the higher
manager salary and the easier it is for workers to get a concession at 71 to
reduce employment.
If the indicator of manager power β  increases, then, in accordance with
Proposition 9, the Nash stability curve shifts down and the stability seg-
ment shrinks (Fig. 4). When managers strongly dominate (β  is large), the
wage rate is close to its reservation value 2. If γ  = 0, then 7.	0	7E  in the
limit and employment decisions are responsive. Otherwise, the Nash stable
employment segment cannot be shorter than [7E	7.].
8 Concluding remarks
This paper is based on six stylized facts extracted from a number of em-
pirical studies devoted to labor markets in Russia and some other transition
economies.
1 Employment decisions are insensitive to changes; labor hoarding
prevails.
2 Wage rates are responsive.
3 There are large interfirm workforce flows (even if market conditions
deteriorate).
4 Employment decisions are more responsive for manager dominated
firms, though the difference is not too large.
5 Insider ownership dominates.
6 Capital markets are poorly designed.Employment  –   wage decisions in the insider-owned firm
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The approach developed above first explained four stylized facts and then
employed the last two of these. We have shown that insensitivity of em-
ployment decisions is a substantial feature of insider-owned firms. The
insensitivity takes place for both worker-controlled and manager-controlled
firms, were managers feel pressure from outsiders, as well as for firms in
which employment decisions are made via bargaining between two groups.
The insensitivity entails a continuum of equilibria. Even if the firms are
identical with respect to technologies and preferences, they may have dif-
ferent employment levels and hence different wage rates.
Moreover, identical firms may respond qualitatively differently to ex-
ternal shocks.
This makes the problem of investigating such a system much more
complicated than would usually be expected. This may be the main source
of difficulties that many researchers face in trying to discover connections
between the behavior of a firm and its ownership structure.
The insensitivity entails efficiency losses when firms refuse to hire or
fire workers in spite of different marginal labor productivities. For a coun-
try like Russia, however, a probable alternative would be a huge rise in
unemployment, up to 35-40 percent. This can hardly be considered as a
better option.
The theory developed and the experience gained to date suggest that the
collective enterprise, established by law, may be a more efficient owner-
ship form for transition economies than the joint stock company owned by
insiders. Efficiency losses would be much lower if worker collectives
could trade their memberships and hire additional workers for competitive
wage rates. This assumes a formal distinction between insider-owners and
workers who are recently employed. It is reasonable to consider a reform
that would introduce this Japanese-type system in Russia.
The results of this paper do not contradict the standard hypotheses re-
garding an important question: « Why is the insiders behavior so different
in different transition countries?» The size of unemployment benefits, cul-
tural factors, managers’ power and, in addition, the initial locations of
firms in their stability segments are among the possible explanatory vari-
ables. However, additional work is needed to produce a convincing an-
swer- an interesting area of future research.Victor Polterovich
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[L* , ∞ ) - stable employment set
[L* , Lo] - effectively stable employment segment
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ABKD - Pareto stability set
KD - contract curve
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